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Philosophy at a Crossroads
Escaping from Irrelevance
di
Carlo CelluCCi*
abstraCt: Although there have never been so many professional philoso-
phers as today, most of the questions discussed by today’s philosophers are 
of no interest to cultured people at large. Specifically, several scientists have 
maintained that philosophy has become an irrelevant subject. Thus philoso-
phy is at a crossroads: either to continue on the present line, which relegates 
it into irrelevance, or to analyse the reasons of the irrelevance and seek an 
escape. This paper is an attempt to explore the second alternative.
keywords: Specialist view of philosophical work, Philosophy as acquisition 
of knowledge, Ordinary philosophy, Extraordinary philosophy
abstraCt: Sebbene non vi siano mai stati tanti filosofi di professione quanti 
oggi, la maggior parte delle questioni discusse dai filosofi odierni non è inte-
ressante per le persone colte in generale. Specificamente, parecchi scienziati 
hanno affermato che la filosofia è diventata un argomento irrilevante. Perciò 
la filosofia è a un bivio: continuare sulla linea attuale, che la relega nell’irrile-
vanza, oppure analizzare le ragioni dell’irrilevanza e cercare una via di uscita. 
Questo articolo è un tentativo di esplorare la seconda alternativa.
keywords: concezione specialistica del lavoro filosofico, la filosofia come 
acquisizione di conoscenza, filosofia ordinaria, filosofia straordinaria
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1. Introduction
The present condition of philosophy is a peculiar one. On the one 
hand, there have never been so many professional philosophers as 
today, on the other hand, philosophy has never been so irrelevant.
By this I mean that most of the questions considered by today’s 
philosophers are of interest only to academics working in a little 
corner of philosophy, not to those working in other corners of philos-
ophy, let alone to people working in other subjects or to cultured peo-
ple at large. This is not healthy for philosophy because, although a 
discipline may exist for some time even with a limited audience, this 
will put its long-term survival at risk, at least in academic institutions.
Thus philosophy is at a crossroads: either to continue on the pres-
ent line, which relegates it into irrelevance, or to analyse the reasons 
of irrelevance and seek an escape. This paper is an attempt to explore 
the latter alternative.
2. The Multiplication of Philosophers and the Irrelevance of Philosophy
That there have never been so many professional philosophers as today 
is clear, for example, from the fact that the American Philosophical 
Association has over ten thousand members. If we add the members 
of the philosophical associations of the other countries, we have a total 
number of some tens of thousands, presumably more than the number 
of philosophers that existed from antiquity to the nineteenth century. 
That there have never been so many professional philosophers as 
today is also clear from the fact that, in the world, there are virtually 
several conferences of philosophy each day of the year, which explains 
why the overwhelming majority of philosophy books published today 
are conference proceedings rather than monographs.
On the other hand, that philosophy has never been so irrelevant 
is clear, for example, from the critical remarks of several scientists.
Thus, Hawking and Mlodinow say that questions such as «How 
can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does 
the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all 
this come from? Did the universe need a creator?» are traditionally 
«questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead»1. It «has not kept 
1 S. Hawking-L. Mlodinow, The grand design, Bantham Books, New York 2010, p. 5.
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up with modern developments in science, particularly physics», so 
«scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our 
quest for knowledge»2.
Weinberg says: «I know of no one who has participated actively 
in the advance of physics in the postwar period whose research has 
been significantly helped by the work of philosophers»3. Philosophy 
of science «at its best seems to me a pleasing gloss on the history and 
discoveries of science. But we should not expect it to provide today’s 
scientists with any useful guidance»4. At most, «the work of some phi-
losophers helps us to avoid the errors of other philosophers»5.
Dyson says that «for most of the twenty-five centuries since writ-
ten history began, philosophers were important», and «until the 
end of the nineteenth century, philosophers were giants playing a 
dominant role in the kingdom of the mind»6. But, «compared with 
the giants of the past», the present philosophers «are a sorry bunch 
of dwarfs. They are thinking deep thoughts and giving scholarly lec-
tures to academic audiences, but hardly anybody in the world outside 
is listening. They are historically insignificant. At some time toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, philosophers faded from public 
life» and «suddenly and silently vanished. So far as the general pub-
lic was concerned, philosophers became invisible»7. This raises the 
question: «When and why did philosophy lose its bite? How did it 
become a toothless relic of past glories?»8.
Many philosophers treat such critical remarks by scientists with 
condescension. For example, Crane argues that, although Hawking 
and Mlodinow claim that «the discipline of academic philosophy is 
dead because it “has not kept up with modern developments in sci-
ence, particularly physics”», their book «itself is full of philosophy»9. 
But «unfortunately, much of the book’s own philosophical argument 
2 Ibidem.
3 S. Weinberg, Dreams of a final theory, Vintage Books, New York 1993, pp. 168-169.
4 Ivi, p. 167.
5 Ivi, p. 168.
6 F. Dyson, Dreams of earth and sky, The New York Review of Books, New York 2015, 
p. 243.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
9 T. Crane, Philosophy, science and the value of understanding, in K. Almqvist-I. Thomas 
(eds.), Sapere aude: The future of the humanities in British universities, Axel and Margaret 
Ax:son Johnson Foundation, Stockholm, in press.
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is of a very low standard, and shows a striking lack of reflection on the 
complexities of what is being claimed»10. Thus, «on the evidence of 
Hawking and Mlodinow’s book, the situation is actually the opposite 
of the way they describe it: it is the scientists who have not kept up 
with developments in philosophy»11.
This argument, however, is an instance of the ad hominem falla-
cy. Instead of answering the Hawking and Mlodinow’s charge that 
the discipline of academic philosophy is dead, it tries to discredit 
Hawking and Mlodinow’s philosophical abilities. Thus, it overlooks 
that discrediting the messenger does not discredit the message.
Anyway, even if most philosophers treat critical remarks by scien-
tists with condescension, a few philosophers admit that philosophy 
has never been so irrelevant.
Thus, Fodor says that today «nobody reads philosophy»12. Or, rath-
er, «academics like me, who eke out their sustenance by writing and 
teaching the stuff, still browse in the journals», but the laity «seems 
to have lost interest. And it’s mostly Anglophone analytic philosophy 
that it has lost interest in»13.
Haack says that «something is rotten in the state of philosophy»14. 
Indeed, «over the years philosophy has become more and more out 
of touch with its own history, more and more hyper-specialized, more 
and more fragmented into cliques, niches, cartels, and fiefdoms, and 
more and more dominated by intellectual fads and fashions»15. A 
non-negligible role has been played in this by «the ever-increasing 
intrusiveness of copy-editors dedicated to ensuring that everyone 
write the same deadly, deadpan academic prose», or «the endless 
demands of» a «peer-review process by now not only relentlessly con-
ventional but also, sometimes, outright corrupt»16.
Frodeman says that «twentieth century philosophy has been 
unhealthily insular»17. Philosophers «became experts like other disci-
10 Ibidem.
11 Ibidem.
12 J. Fodor, Water’s water everywhere, «London Review of Books» 26/20 (2004), pp. 
17-19, p. 17.
13 Ibidem.
14 S. Haack, The real question: Can philosophy be saved?, «Free Inquiry» 37/6 (2017), pp. 
40-43, p. 40. 
15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
17 R. Frodeman, Philosophy dedisciplined, «Synthese» 190 (2013), pp. 1917-1936, p. 1918.
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plinary specialists»18. They developed «sub-specializations far from the 
comprehension of the person on the street»19. But a philosophy «where 
philosophers primarily work with and write for other philosophers, is 
in the end no philosophy at all»20. This «is part of what has led philos-
ophy, potentially the most relevant of subjects, to become a synonym 
for irrelevance»21.
That philosophy, potentially the most relevant of subjects, has 
become a synonym for irrelevance, should deeply worry philoso-
phers and convince them that there is something intrinsically wrong 
with the present approach to a subject that was once hailed as «the 
supreme among the sciences»22. And «most divine and most worthy»23.
As Bobbio humorously says, the irrelevance of philosophy risks 
proving right «Xanthippe, Socrates’s wife, who has gone down in tra-
dition as the wife that does not understand why her husband wastes 
his time discussing philosophy, becoming embroiled in discussions 
that are of no use. And what if she were right?»24.
3. The Specialist View of Philosophical Work
A consequence of the fact that there have never been so many pro-
fessional philosophers as today is the specialist view of philosophical 
work. By this I mean the view according to which a philosopher should 
confine his research to a small sector of the discipline, deriving the 
theme and a good deal of the contents of his research from the reference 
philosophical community, and basing his research on the fundamental 
assumptions generally accepted by the members of that community.
A passionate praise of the specialist view of philosophical work is 
made by Marconi. He observes that, while the traditional image of the 
philosopher was that of «the Great Philosopher», in the past century 
there has been a multiplication of philosophers, so «the image of the 
Great Philosopher tended to tarnish»25. How could there be «dozens and 
18 R. Frodeman-A. Briggle, Socrates tenured, Rowman & Littlefield, London 2016, p. 7. 
19 Ivi, p. 9.
20 R. Frodeman, Philosophy dedisciplined, cit., p. 1935.
21 Ivi, p. 1918.
22 Aristot., Metaph., A 2, 982 b 4.
23 Ivi, A 2, 983 a 5.
24 N. Bobbio, La filosofia e il bisogno di senso, Morcelliana, Brescia 2017, p. 45.
25 D. Marconi, Il mestiere di pensare: La filosofia nell’epoca del professionismo, Einaudi, 
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then hundreds of personalities capable of so much? Wasn’t there some-
thing ridiculous about this infinite multiplication of world systems, all-
gemeine Wissenschaftslehren, revelations of the essence of things?»26. Thus, 
«it was necessary to find ways to make philosophy a task within the reach 
of scholars perhaps educated and intelligent, but not necessarily genius-
es nor astonishingly original», and to make the professional philosopher 
more into «a competent artisan» than into «a cathedrals architect»27. The 
answer to this situation has been the specialist view of philosophical 
work. The traditional image of the Great Philosopher has been replaced 
with that of a professional who, like a scientist, aims at a partial task. 
In particular, there have been three main solutions to «the problem 
of transforming the Great Philosopher into a philosophy professional»28.
The first solution has been history of philosophy, since this «was a 
work within the reach of many people», not requiring an «encyclope-
dic knowledge, or Descartes’ or Kant’s inventiveness»29. For such rea-
son, this solution «had, and still has, great fortune»30. Nevertheless «it 
had a drawback: it deprived philosophy of its theoretical soul», since 
«it made philosophers into football journalists, from football players 
that they had been»31. And, as Floridi says, «to maintain that histori-
ographic research is today the best training ground to become good 
philosophers means to have lost sight of the fundamental difference 
between sports reporters and professional footballers»32. Therefore, 
«this solution has not been the most successful one among philoso-
phers who did not intend to give up the theoretical vocation»33.
The second solution has been hermeneutics, which, in Gadamer’s 
version, required «to reconstruct individual events, to describe specific 
constellations of concepts, and mostly – in practice – to narrate the use 
certain authors made of certain words»34. These tasks are surely «chal-
lenging, but within the reach of many scholars of less than Kantian 
Turin 2014, p. 18.
26 Ibidem.
27 Ivi, pp. 18-19.
28 Ivi, p. 60.
29 Ivi, p. 20.
30 Ibidem.
31 Ibidem.
32 L. Floridi, I filosofi: calciatori o giornalisti?, in F. P. Firrao (ed.), La filosofia italiana in 
discussione, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2001, pp. 337-361, p. 345.
33 D. Marconi, Il mestiere di pensare, cit., p. 20.
34 Ivi, p. 22.
19
Philosophy at a Crossroads: Escaping from Irrelevance
or Hegelian standing»35. In this respect, «the hermeneutic solution 
is similar to the historico-philosophical solution; but, in addition, it 
has the advantage of presenting itself as a theoretical research, which 
fully meets that need of illuminating the present which is traditionally 
assigned to philosophy, and which may be thought to be frustrated 
by historico-philosophical research»36. However, this solution has the 
drawback that, as Engel says, it views philosophy as «something that 
has been» already «done, upon which you can only comment, propose 
new readings, or to which you come back»37.
The third solution has been analytic philosophy, which is «inter-
ested in philosophical problems in their current formulation», not in 
their «past history»38. This «permits one to restrict one’s research area 
as much as desired», and «the temporal limitation to strict contempo-
raries drastically limits bibliographies»39. The analytic philosopher, 
being freed of «the enormous task of providing an overall view of 
things, can be identified – along with natural scientists – as a profes-
sional who tries to give a contribution to the solution of a problem 
at which many others work»40. Thus, analytic philosophy «is the 
paradigm of the artisan view of philosophy: the one that considers 
philosophy as an “honest craft”, not reserved for geniuses but open 
to many people»41. This is the solution most suited «for a situation in 
which professional philosophers are some tens of thousands»42.
In a sense, Marconi is right. Analytic philosophy is the solution 
best suited for philosophers in a situation in which professional 
philosophers are some tens of thousands, because it allows mass pro-
duction. Thus, it permit philosophers to multiply their publications, 
which is quite advantageous to further their academic careers.
But the question is not whether analytic philosophy is the solu-
tion best suited for philosophers, but if it is the solution best suited 
for philosophy, or rather it is itself one of the causes of its irrelevance. 
Since analytic philosophy is today the most widespread in the world, 
35 Ibidem.
36 Ibidem.
37 P. Engel, French and American philosophical dispositions, «Stanford French Review» 
15 (1991), pp. 165-181, p. 170.
38 D. Marconi, Il mestiere di pensare, cit., p. 23.
39 Ivi, p. 24.
40 Ibidem.
41 Ivi, p. 25.
42 Ibidem.
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there is a legitimate suspicion that it has some significant responsi-
bility in the present irrelevance of philosophy. Before dealing with 
this question, I will consider some limitations of the specialist view 
of philosophical work.
4. Analytic Philosophy and the Specialist View of Philosophical Work
Marconi’s praise of the specialist view of philosophical work is char-
acteristic of analytic philosophy. Carnap made an equally passionate 
praise of the specialist view of philosophical work already in 1928. 
According to Carnap, traditional philosophy has very little to 
show for two and a half thousand years of endeavour, because its 
propositions «have no logical contents, but are only expressions of 
feeling»43. Indeed, «the attitude of the traditional philosopher» is 
«like that of a poet»44. Conversely, with analytic philosophy a «new 
type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the 
special sciences»45. The philosophers of the new type «have taken the 
strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their 
guideline for philosophical work»46. The individual philosopher «no 
longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of phi-
losophy. Instead, each works at his special place within the one uni-
fied science»47. For, «if we allot to the individual in philosophical work 
as in the special sciences only a partial task», then «in slow careful 
construction insight after insight will be won. Each collaborator con-
tributes only what he can endorse and justify before the whole body 
of his co-workers»48. Thus «stone will be carefully added to stone and 
a safe building will be erected at which each following generation can 
continue to work», and this will «eliminate all speculative and poetic 
work from philosophy»49. 
As apparent from Carnap’s and Marconi’s statements, the spe-
cialist view of philosophical work is based on the supposition that 
43 R. Carnap, Logical syntax of language, Routledge, London 2001, p. 278.
44 R. Carnap, The logical structure of the world and Pseudoproblems in philosophy, Open 
Court, Chicago 2003, p. xvi.
45 Ibidem.
46 Ibidem.
47 Ibidem.
48 Ivi, p. xvii.
49 Ibidem.
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all philosophical work is cumulative. That is, it progresses in small 
increments that build over prior work, without involving any change 
in the fundamental assumptions generally accepted by the members 
of the reference philosophical community. 
However, the supposition that all philosophical work is cumula-
tive is unjustified. Analytic philosophers have opposite views even on 
key issues.
For example, with respect to the issue of the relation between phi-
losophy and science, on the one hand, Quine supports scientism, the 
view that the present sciences are the only true channel of knowledge. 
For, he maintains that «the only point of view» philosophy «can offer» 
is «the point of view of our own science»50. That is, the point of view 
of the present sciences. Therefore, philosophical explanations must 
be replaced with “naturalized” versions, which explain the concepts 
with which human beings operate in terms of scientific concepts, 
that is, in terms of «the very fruits of science»51. On the other hand, 
Dummett opposes scientism. For, he maintains that «to regard the 
natural sciences as the only true channel of knowledge» is to reduce 
the task of philosophy «to that of adding ornamentation to the the-
ories of the scientists»52. Also, to «replace philosophical explanations 
with “naturalized” versions» which «explain our having the concepts 
that we do in terms» of scientific concepts, «is not philosophy; but it 
is not science either. It is the result of the bedazzlement of those who 
have undertaken one manner of intellectual inquiry via the successes 
of another»53.
In addition to the issue of the relation between philosophy and 
science, there are many other key issues on which analytic philoso-
phers have opposite views54.
Since the supposition that all philosophical work is cumulative is 
unjustified, the specialist view of philosophical work is inadequate.
50 W. V. Quine, Theories and things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1981, p. 181.
51 W. V. Quine, From stimulus to science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1995, p. 16.
52 M. Dummett, The nature and future of philosophy, Columbia University Press, New 
York 2010, p. 35.
53 Ivi, p. 36.
54 For an empirical study, see D. Bourget-D. J. Chalmers, What do philosophers 
believe?, «Philosophical Studies» 170 (2014), pp. 465-500; see also, D. J. Chalmers, 
Why isn’t there more progress in philosophy?, «Philosophy» 90 (2015), pp. 3-31.
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5. Analytic Philosophy and the Irrelevance of Philosophy
After considering some limitations of the specialist view of philo-
sophical work, I return to the question of the responsibility of analyt-
ic philosophy in the irrelevance of philosophy.
As Marconi says, analytic philosophy permits one to restrict one’s 
research area as much as desired. This has led many analytic phi-
losophers to deal with ever more minute questions, irrelevant to our 
understanding of the world. Instead of concerning themselves with 
questions about the world, they have concerned themselves with 
questions suggested by other analytic philosophers.
Galileo admonishes philosophers that their «discourses should be 
about the sensible world and not about a world of paper»55.
Haack gives a similar admonishment: «Never forget that philoso-
phy, like physics or biology, is about the world, not just about our lan-
guage or our concepts – and especially, not just about what another 
member of this or that little professional circle said last year»56.
Yet, many analytic philosophers treat philosophy as being not 
about the world, but just about what another member of this or that 
little professional circle said last year.
Thus, Moore says: «I do not think that the world» would «ever 
have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggest-
ed philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers 
have said about the world»57. The problems in which «I have been 
(and still am) very keenly interested» are «first, the problem of trying 
to get really clear as to what on earth a given philosopher meant by 
something which he said, and, secondly, the problem of discovering 
what really satisfactory reasons there are for supposing that what he 
said was true, or, alternatively, was false»58.
This position, however, is self-defeating. For, Moore would not 
have been able to discuss things which other philosophers said about 
the world if all philosophers had been like him, that is, if they had 
not concerned themselves with problems suggested by the world. 
55 G. Galilei, Opere, vol. VII, Barbera, Florence 1968, p. 139.
56 S. Haack, The fragmentation of philosophy, the road to reintegration, in J. F. Göhner-
E.-M. Jung (eds.), Susan Haack: Reintegrating philosophy, Springer, Cham 2016, pp. 
3-32, pp. 26-27.
57 G. E. Moore, An autobiography, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore, 
Open Court, La Salle 1942, pp. 3-39, p. 14.
58 Ibidem.
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Nor Moore would have been able to discover what really satisfactory 
reasons there were for supposing that what other philosophers said 
about the world was true, or, alternatively, was false, without dealing 
with questions about the world.
Wittgenstein says that «philosophy gives no pictures of reality»59. It 
«arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need 
to grasp causal connections»60. In philosophy, «there are no great essen-
tial problems in the sense of science»61. Philosophy «is a tool which 
serves only for use against philosophers»62.
This has given rise to a new kind of philosophy, characterized by 
an argumentative style made of dreary distinctions concerning ever 
more minute questions, irrelevant to our understanding of the world.
Thus, Williamson says: «To give an example of the kind of prob-
lem that I’m interested in, we can say that J. F. Kennedy and Marilyn 
Monroe could have had a child, and the issue arises of whether 
one can say that there is such a thing as a possible child of JFK and 
Marilyn Monroe. If so, what sort of thing is it? This is an area which 
is susceptible of quite rigorous logical analysis»63.
But the question is not whether this is an area which is suscepti-
ble of quite rigorous logical analysis, it is rather whether it is an area 
capable of making any significant contribution to our understanding 
of the world.
In this regard, Dennett suggests the following significance test. 
If you are tempted to deal with some problem discussed within the 
reference philosophical community, and wonder whether the prob-
lem is significant and worth pursuing, «don’t count on the validation 
of your fellow graduate students or your favorite professors» or any 
other member of the reference philosophical community, for «they 
all have a vested interest in keeping the enterprise going. It’s what 
they know how to do; it’s what they are good at»64. Rather, try «seeing 
if folks outside philosophy», or uninitiated «undergraduates, can be 
59 L. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 1991, p. 106.
60 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen – Philosophical investigations, Wiley-
Blackwell, Oxford 2009, part I, § 89.
61 L. Wittgenstein, The big typescript TS 213, Blackwell, Oxford 2005, p. 301.
62 L. Wittgenstein, Typescript beginning “Muss sich denn nicht”. Probably 1932 or 1933. 
24 pp. http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-219_f [18.06.2018], p. 11.
63 T. Williamson, On vagueness, in J. Baggini-J. Stangroom (eds.), New British philosophy, 
Routledge, London 2002, pp. 147-162, p. 162.
64 D. C. Dennett, Higher-order truths about Chmess, «Topoi» 25 (2006), pp. 39-41, p. 40.
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made to care»65. If they cannot be made to care, you should consider 
the possibility that «you’re following a self-supporting community of 
experts into an artifactual trap»66. 
Would the kind of problem in which Williamson is interested 
pass Dennett’s test? It seems very doubtful. Generally, many problems 
considered by analytic philosophers would not pass Dennett’s test 
because, as Dennett says, «many projects in contemporary» analytic 
«philosophy are artifactual puzzles of no abiding significance»67.
That many projects in contemporary analytic philosophy are arti-
factual puzzles of no abiding significance, is a first main cause of the 
irrelevance of philosophy.
6. An Analytic Reaction to the Irrelevance of Philosophy
Of course, the vast majority of analytic philosophers would deny that 
many projects in contemporary analytic philosophy are artifactual 
puzzles of no abiding significance.
Thus, Casati claims that «the work done in philosophy in the last 
century, if not in the last twenty years, is incomparably more interest-
ing and clear than the work done by the masters of ages past»68. It «is 
thus better, if one wants to get a grip on what preoccupies a profes-
sional epistemologist, to read, rather than the Theaetetus, the works 
by “a named BonJour”»69. Indeed, there is no proof that «history of 
philosophy has any relevance whatsoever to philosophy», so philoso-
phers may «ignore both history of philosophy and other traditions»70. 
These claims are peculiar, in particular because much work by 
analytic professional epistemologists has been concerned with the 
view that knowledge is justified true belief – a view that Plato had 
already shown to be untenable just in the Theaetetus 71. 
Nevertheless, some analytic philosophers admit that several ana-
lytic philosophers have produced philosophy which many people 
65 Ivi, p. 41.
66 Ivi, p. 40.
67 Ivi, p. 39.
68 R. Casati, Review of P. Rossi (ed.), La filosofia, «Dialectica» 55 (2001), pp. 74-84, p. 75.
69 Ibidem.
70 Ibidem.
71 See C. Cellucci, Rethinking knowledge: The heuristic view, Springer, Cham 2017, 
Section 6.1.
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consider irrelevant, and hence look for an escape from irrelevance.
Such is the case of Unger, who says that analytic philosophy «offers 
little or nothing substantial about concrete reality»72. It is «heavily 
pervaded with concretely empty ideas»73. Namely, with ideas «empty 
of import for, or as regards to, concrete reality»74. For, according to ana-
lytic philosophy, «by contrast with the natural sciences, intellectually 
responsible philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the 
general nature of concrete reality»75. Therefore, analytic philosophy is 
a «terribly deficient philosophy, at least as compared with much phi-
losophy saliently offered in earlier eras»76. Conversely, «it’s proper for 
philosophy to offer quite substantial ideas about concrete reality»77.
But what escape does Unger suggest for philosophy? He main-
tains that, «for there to be any significant hope as regards philoso-
phy’s prospects, at least two things must come to pass»78. First, «some 
of the most intelligent and philosophically talented young people 
must become serious scientists, contributing a great deal to the sci-
ence in which they are involved»79. Second, «we must not require so 
very much of a proposed idea, by way of depth», for «the idea to count 
as a properly philosophical thought» a «little leeway» must be «toler-
ated»80. Specifically, «as regards matters of depth», it must be tolerat-
ed that there will be «a significant difference between what will be 
allowed to count as a philosophical idea and, on the other side, very 
nearly all other concretely substantial ideas, including very nearly all 
scientific substantial propositions»81.
Unger’s suggested escape, however, seems unrealistic. As Unger him-
self admits, «it will be extremely difficult and, perhaps, it may be very 
unlikely», that the two things in question will come to pass; but, «short 
of that, there is no realistic chance, at all, for there being offered, during 
the next century or so, any new concretely substantial philosophical 
72 P. Unger, Empty ideas: A critique of analytic philosophy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2014, p. 21.
73 Ivi, p. 25.
74 Ivi, p. 6.
75 Ivi, p. 1.
76 Ivi, p. 21.
77 Ibidem.
78 Ivi, p. 239.
79 Ibidem. 
80 Ivi, p. 240.
81 Ibidem.
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ideas that amount to anything much more than idle speculation»82.
However, even if the two things in question came to pass, this 
would not be very gratifying for philosophy, since it would reduce 
philosophy to a weekend occupation for scientists. Indeed, the image 
of the philosopher of the future that Unger puts forward is that of a 
scientist who, in addition to doing his normal work as a scientist, on 
weekends philosophizes on it, but without too many pretensions. For, 
one cannot be too picky, one cannot demand that philosophical work 
be marked with depth.
7. Philosophy as Acquisition of Knowledge
If we want to rescue philosophy from irrelevance, we must ask: What 
is philosophy? 
Several people consider this question insignificant. For example, 
Popper claims that a philosopher «should try to solve philosophical 
problems, rather than talk about philosophy»83. 
This claim is somewhat inconsistent of the author of a paper enti-
tled: «How I see philosophy»84. Anyhow, the claim is unjustified. For, 
what sort of philosophy one does and what problems one wants to 
solve, depend on what answer one gives to the question “What is phi-
losophy?” From its very beginning as a discipline, philosophy has called 
into question all human knowledge including itself, so philosophy has 
always been, to some extent at least, a discourse about philosophy.
A crucial question about philosophy is the relation of philosophy 
to knowledge. Therefore, any answer to the question “What is philos-
ophy?” will involve an answer to the question of the relation of philos-
ophy to knowledge. 
In fact, the only answer to the question “What is philosophy?” 
that might rescue philosophy from irrelevance, is: Philosophy is 
acquisition of knowledge. For, only if philosophy is acquisition of 
knowledge, philosophy can be useful and relevant to our understand-
ing of the world.
82 Ibidem.
83 K. R. Popper, Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge, 
Routledge, London 1974, p. 68.
84 See K. R. Popper, In search of a better world: Lectures and essays from thirty years, 
Routledge, London 1994, pp. 173-187. 
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The view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge is by no means 
new. It goes back to the very beginning of philosophy as a discipline.
Indeed, Plato says: «Philosophy is acquisition of knowledge [ktesis 
epistemes]»85. For, only «the one who wholeheartedly tries all knowl-
edge, who is eager to know and is insatiable for it, may be rightly 
called a philosopher»86. Thus, «to be a philosopher is the same thing 
as to be a lover of knowledge»87. Philosophy aims at acquiring all 
possible knowledge about the world, and at giving a global view of 
it, since «anyone who can have a global view is a philosopher, and 
anyone who can’t isn’t»88. 
One might think that to say that philosophy is acquisition of 
knowledge contrasts with the etymological meaning of the word phi-
losophia, that is, “love of wisdom”. But it is not so. Already Plato makes 
it clear that wisdom cannot be separated from knowledge. 
Indeed, Plato says: «What makes people wise is wisdom», and 
wisdom is in no way «different from knowledge», since people are 
«wise in just those things of which they have knowledge», therefore 
«knowledge and wisdom are the same thing»89.
One might also think that to say that philosophy is acquisition 
of knowledge means that philosophy is acquisition of theoretical 
knowledge, not of practical knowledge. But it is not so. Once again, 
already Plato makes it clear that philosophy is acquisition of both 
theoretical and practical knowledge.
Indeed, Plato says that one can «divide all knowledge» into two forms, 
«theoretical knowledge», and «practical knowledge»90. Theoretical 
knowledge is proper to arts which are «stripped of action and furnish 
only cognition»91. Practical knowledge is «knowledge which naturally 
inheres in actions»92. But the division of knowledge into two forms is 
not an opposition, theoretical and practical knowledge are simply «the 
two forms of knowledge, which is one in its entirety»93. And «the phi-
losopher desires the whole of knowledge, not just one part of it and not 
85 Plat., Euthyd., 288d 8.
86 Plat., Resp., V 475c 6-8.
87 Ivi, II 376b 9-10.
88 Ivi, VII 537c 7.
89 Plat., Theaet., 145d 11-e 6.
90 Plat., Polit., 258e 4-5.
91 Ivi, 258d 5-6.
92 Ivi, 258d 9-e 1.
93 Ivi, 258e 6-7.
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the other»94. Therefore, philosophy is acquisition of both theoretical 
and practical knowledge.
8. The Tradition of Philosophy as Acquisition of Knowledge
From antiquity to the end of the nineteenth century, many people 
have reaffirmed the view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge.
Thus, Aristotle says that «philosophy is rightly called knowledge 
of the truth»95. But «we do not know a truth without knowing its 
cause»96. So, philosophy is primarily knowledge of first principles, 
since first principles «are the cause of the being of other things»97. 
Therefore, «it is through them and from them that the other things 
are known»98. Knowledge of first principles and wisdom are the same 
thing, because «wisdom is knowledge of first principles»99.
Cicero says: «Philosophy, to interpret the word, is nothing else but 
the study of wisdom. And wisdom, as the old philosophers defined it, 
is knowledge of divine and human things and of the causes by which 
these things are connected together»100. 
Bacon says: «I have taken all knowledge to be my province»101. 
Philosophy is a «universal science, to be as the mother of the rest, and 
to be regarded in the progress of knowledge as portion of the main 
and common way», thus, a «Philosophia Prima» which «may be a recep-
tacle for all such axioms as are not peculiar to any of the particular 
sciences, but belong to several of them in common»102.
Descartes says: «This word “philosophy” means the study of wis-
dom», where «by “wisdom” is meant not only prudence in everyday 
affairs, but also a perfect knowledge of all things that mankind is capa-
ble of knowing, both for the conduct of his life, and for the conservation 
of his health, and for the discovery of all the arts»103. Indeed, «to try to 
94 Plat., Resp., V 475b 8-9.
95 Aristot., Metaph., α 1, 993b 19-20.
96 Ivi, α 1, 993b 23-24.
97 Ivi, α 1, 993b, 29-30.
98 Ivi, A 2, 982b 2-3.
99 Ivi, K 1, 1059a 18.
100 Cic., De off., II 2, 5.
101 F. Bacon, Works, Longmans, London 1857-1874, vol. VIII p. 109.
102 Ivi, vol. IV p. 337.
103 R. Descartes, Oeuvres, Vrin, Paris 1996, vol. IX.2, p. 2.
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acquire» this kind of knowledge «is properly termed philosophizing»104.
Hobbes says: «Philosophy» is «the study of wisdom»105. And «wis-
dom, properly called, is nothing else» but «the perfect knowledge of 
the truth in all matters whatsoever»106.
Spinoza says: «The aim of philosophy is nothing but truth», and 
«philosophy should be drawn from nature alone»107. For, «the universal 
history of nature» is «the sole ground of philosophy»108.
Kant says: «Philosophy» is «either cognition from pure reason or 
rational cognition from empirical principles»109. In either case, phi-
losophy involves cognitions, because «without cognitions one will 
never become a philosopher»110. In addition to cognitions, philosophy 
involves that one «sees how all cognitions fit together in an edifice, 
in rule-governed ways, for such ends as are suited to humanity»111. 
Thus philosophy involves wisdom, since «wisdom is the relation» of 
a cognition «to the essential ends of humanity»112. Conversely, wisdom 
involves knowledge and science, because «wisdom without science is 
a silhouette of a perfection to which we will never attain»113.
Spencer says: «Though in the extent of the sphere which they 
have supposed philosophy to fill, men have differed and still differ 
very widely, yet there is a real if unavowed agreement among them 
in signifying» by “philosophy” a special kind of knowledge, that is, 
«knowledge of the highest degree of generality»114.
Mach says: «Scientific thought presents itself in two seemingly dif-
ferent forms: as philosophy and as specialist research», that is, research 
of «the specialist scientist»115. But «the ultimate end of all research is 
104 Ibidem.
105 T. Hobbes, English works, Longman, London 1839-1845, vol. I p. xiv.
106 Ivi, vol. II p. iii.
107 B. Spinoza, Theological-political treatise, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2007, p. 184.
108 Ivi, p. 191.
109 I. Kant, Critique of pure reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, A 
840/B 868.
110 I. Kant, Lectures on logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992, p. 538.
111 Ivi, p. 261.
112 I. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, de Gruyter, Berlin 1900–, vol. XVI p. 66, Reflexion 1652.
113 I. Kant, Lectures on logic, cit., p. 539.
114 H. Spencer, A system of synthetic philosophy, Vol. I: First principles, Williams and 
Norgate, London 1887, Part II, § 37, p. 131.
115 E. Mach, Knowledge and error: Sketches on the psychology of enquiry, Springer, 
Dordrecht 1976, p. 2.
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just the same. This shows itself also in the fact that the greatest phi-
losophers» have «opened up new ways of specialist enquiry» for the 
specialist scientist, and «philosophy has furnished science with some 
positive notions of value too»116.
9. Analytic Philosophy and the Advancement of Knowledge
While, from antiquity to the end of the nineteenth century, many 
people have reaffirmed the view that philosophy is acquisition of 
knowledge, in the twentieth century this view has been abandoned. In 
particular, many analytic philosophers have claimed that philosophy 
does not advance knowledge.
Thus, Wittgenstein says that philosophy does not advance knowl-
edge, since it is «essential to» philosophical «investigation that we do 
not seek to learn anything new by it», but only «to understand some-
thing that is already in plain view»117. For, «since everything lies open 
to view, there is nothing to explain», and, on the other hand, «whatever 
may be hidden is of no interest to us»118. Philosophy «leaves everything 
as it is»119. It «just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything», indeed, «the name “philosophy” might also be 
given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions»120. 
Ryle says that «philosophy is not a sister science or a parent sci-
ence», since «its business is not to add to the number of scientific 
statements»121. Philosophy is «intended not to increase what we know» 
but only to determine «the logical geography of the knowledge which 
we already possess»122. Namely, philosophy is intended only «to reveal 
the logic of the propositions in which» knowledge is «wielded, that 
is to say, to show with what other propositions they are consistent 
and inconsistent, what propositions follow from them and from what 
propositions they follow»123. For, philosophy is only «the clarification 
116 Ivi, p. 3.
117 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, cit., Part I, § 89.
118 Ivi, Part I, § 126.
119 Ivi, Part I, § 124.
120 Ivi, Part I, § 126.
121 G. Ryle, Collected papers, vol. I, Routledge, Abingdon 2009, pp. 261-262.
122 G. Ryle, The concept of mind, Routledge, Abingdon 2009, p. lix.
123 Ivi, p. lx.
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of ideas»124. The «philosopher throws new light, but he does not give 
new information»125. 
Dummett says that philosophy «is indeed concerned with reality, 
but not to discover new facts about it», it only «seeks to improve our 
understanding of what we already know. It does not seek to observe 
more, but to clarify our vision of what we see»126. Thus, «philosophy 
does not advance knowledge: it clarifies what we already know»127. 
Hacker says that «philosophy is not a contribution to human 
knowledge, but to human understanding»128. It does not advance 
knowledge, indeed one might even «say, with only a little exaggera-
tion, that in philosophy, ‘If it’s news, it’s wrong’»129.
That many analytic philosophers have maintained that philoso-
phy does not advance knowledge, marks a sharp discontinuity with 
the philosophical tradition starting with Plato according to which 
philosophy is acquisition of knowledge.
Wittgenstein says: «My method throughout is to point out mis-
takes in language. I am going to use the word “philosophy” for the 
activity of pointing out such mistakes. Why do I wish to call our 
present activity philosophy, when we also call Plato’s activity philoso-
phy? Perhaps because of a certain analogy between them, or perhaps 
because of the continuous development of the subject»130. 
But it is not so. By maintaining that philosophy does not advance 
knowledge since it is merely the activity of pointing out mistakes in 
language, analytic philosophy is sharply discontinuous with the phil-
osophical tradition, in particular with Plato’s activity.
That many analytic philosophers have maintained that philoso-
phy does not advance knowledge is another main cause of the irrele-
vance of philosophy. For, if philosophy does not advance knowledge, 
if we do not seek to learn anything new by it, how can philosophy be 
useful, and what chance has it to continue to exist? Philosophy is like 
124 G. Ryle, Collected papers, cit., vol. II, p. 212.  
125 Ivi, p. 173. 
126 M. Dummett, The nature and future of philosophy, cit., p. 10.
127 Ivi, p. 21.
128 P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Comparisons and context, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2013, p. 9.
129 Ivi, p. 19.
130 L. Wittgenstein, Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935, Prometheus Books, New York 1979, 
pp. 27-28.
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«a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it»131.
10. Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism
While maintaining that philosophy does not advance knowledge, 
inconsistently enough some leading analytic philosophers have 
admitted that philosophy should be acquisition of knowledge.
Thus, Moore says that «the first and most important problem of 
philosophy is: To give a general description of the whole Universe»132. 
Russell says that, «what concerns philosophy is the universe as a 
whole»133. But, while «philosophers from Thales onwards have tried to 
understand the world» and, «even when they have failed, they have 
supplied material to their successors and an incentive to new efforts», 
analytic philosophy is not «carrying on this tradition»134. It seems «to 
have abandoned, without necessity, that grave and important task 
which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto pursued», and 
«to concern itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only 
with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things»135. In 
particular, Wittgenstein «seems to have grown tired of serious think-
ing and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activi-
ty unnecessary»136. His «positive doctrines seem to me trivial», and his 
«negative doctrines, unfounded»137. But, «if this is all that philosophy 
has to offer, I cannot think that it is a worthy subject of study»138.
Dummett says that, if philosophy is taught today in universities, it 
is only because of a «historical precedent», namely that, «when the first 
Western universities came into being», philosophy «was not sharply dif-
ferentiated from what we call “natural science”», and «the quest for truth 
was a single activity»139. Then it was easy to find a justification for philos-
ophy. But, in the twentieth century, «the distinction between the natural 
131 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, cit., Part I, § 271.
132 G. E. Moore, Some main problems of philosophy, Allen & Unwin, London 1953, p. 2. 
133 B. Russell, An outline of philosophy, Routledge, London 1995, p. 189.
134 B. Russell, My philosophical development, Routledge, London 1995, p. 170.
135 Ibidem.
136 Ivi, p. 161.
137 Ivi, pp. 160-161.
138 Ivi, p. 170.
139 M. Dummett, The nature and future of philosophy, cit., p. 2.
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sciences and the humanities came to be universally recognized»140. So, it 
has become difficult to find a justification for philosophy. Indeed, «if uni-
versities had been an invention of the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, would anyone have thought to include philosophy among the sub-
jects that they taught and studied? It seems very doubtful»141. Therefore, 
«it would be easy to conclude that» philosophy «is an anachronism»142. 
The «layman or non-professional expects philosophers to answer deep 
questions of great import for an understanding of the world», and «the 
layman is quite right: if philosophy does not aim at answering such ques-
tions, it is worth nothing»143.
But, contrary to the layman’s expectation, many analytic philos-
ophers do not answer deep questions of great import for an under-
standing of the world. Even Ayer admits that many analytic philoso-
phers «do not set out to describe, or even to explain, the world, still 
less to change it. Their concern is only with the way in which we 
speak about the world», so for them philosophy «is talk about talk»144. 
This has driven philosophy into «the scholasticism which has been 
threatening to overtake it»145. 
At the origin of the scholasticism of analytic philosophy there 
is the fact that, as Feyerabend points out, in analytic philosophy 
departments, students are «trained to repeat the tricks after» their 
instructors, «so that sometime in the future they may perhaps be able 
to become trainers themselves, modifying the tricks a little here and 
there (this is called “original research”)»146. For, analytic philosophy 
«assumes that it is good to conform» to the standards which are deter-
mined by the «consensus of those in the discipline»147. Ultimately, this 
amounts to assuming that it is good to conform to «the professional 
nonsense that comes out of Oxford»148. This assumption contrasts 
140 Ivi, p. 3.
141 Ivi, p. 2.
142 Ibidem.
143 M. Dummett, The logical basis of metaphysics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
1991, p. 1.
144 A. J. Ayer, The concept of a person and other essays, St Martin’s Press, New York 1963, p. 3.
145 Ivi, p. 35.
146 P. Feyerabend, Letters to the Director of the Department of Philosophy, in M. 
Motterlini (ed.), I. Lakatos-P. Feyerabend, For and against method, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1999, pp. 382-393, p. 386.
147 Ivi, p. 384.
148 Ivi, p. 386.
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with the fact that «philosophy has very often turned against the 
status quo», indeed, «this is one of the most eminent functions of 
philosophy»149. People in analytic philosophy might object: If you do 
not conform to the standards which are determined by the consensus 
of those in the discipline, «will the “standards of philosophy” suffer 
from this?»150. To this one may answer: «Well, Plato says that all things 
change for the worse; the worst thing alone will change for the better. 
The standards of philosophy, then, can only improve»151.
11. Some Remarks about Philosophy as Acquisition of Knowledge
To avoid misunderstandings, it may be useful to make some remarks 
about the view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge.
(1) In the statement that philosophy is acquisition of knowl-
edge, “knowledge” is supposed to include methods of acquisition of 
knowledge. Indeed, the acquisition of knowledge may require new 
methods, since nothing guarantees that the methods that permitted 
the acquisition of the present knowledge will also permit the acqui-
sition of new kinds of knowledge. Therefore, it is important that 
“knowledge” is understood as including methods of acquisition of 
knowledge. Grice even says: «By and large the greatest philosophers 
have been the greatest, and the most self-conscious, methodologists; 
indeed, I am tempted to regard this fact as primarily accounting for 
their greatness as philosophers»152.
(2) The view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge must not 
be confused with Russell’s view of philosophy. Admittedly, Russell 
says that «philosophy arises from an unusually obstinate attempt to 
arrive at real knowledge»153. And «philosophy is distinguished from 
science only by being more critical»154. But this does not mean that, 
according to Russell, philosophy is acquisition of knowledge. Indeed, 
Russell declares that the acquisition of knowledge «is the business of 
149 Ivi, p. 383.
150 Ivi, p. 387.
151 Ibidem.
152 P. Grice, Reply to Richards, in R. E. Grandy-R. Warner (eds.), Philosophical grounds 
of rationality: Intentions, categories, ends, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 
45-106, p. 66.
153 B. Russell, An outline of philosophy, cit. p. 1. 
154 Ivi, p. 239.
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science rather than of philosophy»155. When he says «that philosophy 
is critical», he means to say «only that it examines the various parts 
of our supposed knowledge to see whether they are mutually consist-
ent and whether the inferences employed are such as seem valid to a 
careful scrutiny»156.
(3) The view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge must not 
be confused with Quine’s view of philosophy. Admittedly, Quine says 
that philosophy is «concerned with our knowledge of the world and 
the nature of the world»157. But he says so simply because he assumes 
that philosophy, properly conceived, is «a part of» the present «sci-
ence»158. In particular, epistemology «is contained in natural science, 
as a chapter of psychology»159. For, according to Quine, only the pres-
ent science is acquisition of knowledge.
(4) The claim of many analytic philosophers that philosophy does 
not advance knowledge conflicts with the fact that, really, philosophy 
has essentially contributed to the advancement of knowledge. 
For example, philosophy has had an essential role in the birth of 
modern science. Thus, Galileo says that there is an intimate connection 
between the new science and «the true and good philosophy, especially 
in that part which concerns the constitution of the universe»160. Indeed, 
there is a substantial difference between the geometer-astronomers, 
who formulate their hypotheses only «to save the appearances in what-
ever way necessary», and «the philosopher-astronomers», who «try to 
investigate, as the greatest and most admirable problem, the true con-
stitution of the universe»161. Copernicus, «putting on the philosopher’s 
dress», engaged himself «in the investigation of this constitution, recog-
nizing» that so «one would have gained in philosophy a knowledge as 
excellent as that which consists in knowing the true disposition of the 
parts of the world»162. Galileo himself «studied for a greater number of 
years in philosophy than months in pure mathematics»163.
155 Ivi, p. 1.
156 Ivi, p. 239.
157 W. V. Quine, Quine in dialogue, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 5-6.
158 Ivi, p. 6.
159 W. V. Quine, Ontological relativity and other essays, Columbia University Press, 
New York 1969, p. 83.
160 G. Galilei, Opere, cit., vol. V p. 102.
161 Ibidem.
162 Ivi, pp. 297-298.
163 Ivi, vol. X p. 353.
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Philosophy has had an essential role, not only in the birth of 
modern science, but also in subsequent physics. Thus, Rovelli says: 
«Newton thought of himself as a philosopher, and started by dis-
cussing this with Descartes, and had strong philosophical ideas»164. 
Also, «Einstein would have never done relativity without having 
read all the philosophers and having a head full of philosophy» and 
«Heisenberg would have never done quantum mechanics without 
being full of philosophy»165. Indeed, Heisenberg argues that «in clas-
sical mechanics there’s something philosophically wrong, there’s 
not enough emphasis on empiricism», and it is this «that allows him 
to construct this fantastically new physical theory, scientific theory, 
which is quantum mechanics»166. The same applies to «Maxwell, 
Boltzmann»167. In fact, «all the major steps of science in the past were 
done by people who were very aware of methodological, fundamen-
tal, even metaphysical questions being posed»168.
(5) The view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge contrasts 
with the sapiential view of philosophy – the view according to which 
philosophy is love of wisdom, understood as an alleged superior kind 
of understanding capable of grasping the essence of things, and inac-
cessible to scientific knowledge and to rational knowledge in general. 
Thus, Heidegger says that «science does not think»169. Indeed, 
«science is the disavowal of all knowledge of truth»170. Only «philos-
ophy is the knowledge of the essence of things», and hence is «sover-
eign knowledge»171.
Gadamer says that philosophy is «concerned to seek the experi-
ence of truth that transcends the domain of scientific method», that 
is, «experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be ver-
ified by the methodological means proper to science»172. 
But this conflicts with the fact that there is no special source of 
164 C. Rovelli, Science is not about certainty: A philosophy of physics, «Edge» 5.30.12, 
https://www.edge.org/conversation/a-philosophy-of-physics [18.06.2018].
165 Ibidem.
166 Ibidem.
167 Ibidem.
168 Ibidem.
169 M. Heidegger, What is called thinking? Harper & Row, New York 1968, p. 8.
170 M. Heidegger, Basic questions of philosophy: Selected “problems” of “logic”, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington 1994, p. 5.
171 Ivi, p. 29.
172 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and method, Continuum, New York 2004, p. xxi.
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knowledge which is available to philosophy but not to science.
(6) The view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge does not 
exclude that other views of philosophy are possible. It only excludes 
that they can convincingly answer the charge that philosophy has 
become irrelevant.
Thus, it excludes that they can convincingly answer the charge, 
attributed to Feynman, that philosophy «is about as useful to scien-
tists as ornithology is to birds»173. 
It excludes that they can convincingly answer Krauss’ charge that 
«science progresses and philosophy doesn’t», and «the worst part of 
philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people» who «read 
work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It 
has no impact on physics what so ever»174. 
It excludes that they can convincingly answer Rota’s charge that 
analytic «philosophers are not concerned with facing up» to «any 
relevant features» of the world; therefore, «like ostriches with their 
heads buried in the sand, they will meet the fate of those who refuse 
to remember the past and fail to face the challenges of our difficult 
present: increasing irrelevance followed by eventual extinction»175.
12. The Objection that Only Science Can be Acquisition of Knowledge
Against the view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge, several 
analytic philosophers have objected that, after the birth of modern 
science, only science can be acquisition of knowledge. 
Thus, Russell says that, what the present «science cannot discover, 
mankind cannot know»176. Therefore, we «shall be wise to build our 
philosophy upon» the present «science»177.
Quine says that the philosopher can only carry out «his reasoning 
within the inherited world theory»178. That is, within the present science. 
173 P. Kitcher, A plea for science studies, in N. Koertge (ed.), A house built on sand: 
Exposing postmodernist myths about science, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998, pp. 
32-56, p. 32.
174 R. Andersen, Has physics made philosophy and religion obsolete? Interview to 
Lawrence Krauss, «The Atlantic» April 23, 2012.
175 G.-C. Rota, Indiscrete thoughts, Birkhäuser, Boston 1997, p. 103.
176 B. Russell, Religion and science, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1974, p. 243.
177 B. Russell, Logic and knowledge, Spokesman, Nottingham 2007, p. 339.
178 W. V. Quine, Theories and things, cit., p. 72.
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For, «scientific method is the way to truth»179.
This objection, however, is unjustified, because it depends on two 
unwarranted assumptions.
The first assumption is that science is acquisition of knowledge 
since it is based on a method which is available to science but not to 
philosophy, namely, the «new scientific method which was fashioned 
almost entirely by Galileo Galilei»180. This assumption is unwarranted 
because, contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, Galilei did not 
fashion a new scientific method. Both Galilei and Newton declared 
to use, and actually used, Aristotle’s analytic-synthetic method as the 
method of modern science181.
The second assumption is that knowledge is exhausted by the 
present sciences, so the present sciences are the only true channel of 
knowledge. This assumption is unwarranted because there are areas of 
experience which the present sciences cannot account for. The pres-
ent sciences are what we already know, philosophy is about what we 
do not yet know, thus philosophy is concerned with questions which 
are beyond the present sciences – not in the sense that they are open 
questions of some of the present sciences, but in the sense that they 
are open questions of none of the present sciences. Dealing with such 
questions requires new ideas, and philosophy may try to devise them182. 
There is much space for philosophy, because philosophy is about what 
we do not yet know, and the things that we do not yet know are plenti-
ful. Already Seneca admonished: «A time will come when our posterity 
will marvel that we were ignorant of such obvious things» (Seneca, Nat. 
Quaest. VII 25).
Of course, being about what we do not yet know, philosophy moves 
on a muddy ground, and is always exposed to the risk of failure. But, 
when successful, philosophy may even open new paths and give birth 
to new sciences. In fact, this is what philosophy has done from the sev-
enteenth century until recently. For example, both computer science 
and cognitive science originated from Turing’s philosophical analysis of 
the computational behaviour of human beings, and Bayesian statistics 
179 W. V. Quine, Word and object, The MIT Press, Cambridge 2013, p. 21.
180 M. Kline, Mathematics for the nonmathematician, Dover, Mineola 1985, p. 284
181 For details, see C. Cellucci, Rethinking logic: Logic in relation to mathematics, evolu-
tion, and method, Springer, Cham 2013, Chap. 8.
182 For some examples of such questions, see C. Cellucci, Rethinking knowledge, cit., 
Section 2.12.
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originated from the philosophical efforts to clarify what a rational belief 
is. There is no reason to suppose that new sciences will not be born in 
the future, and that none of them will originate from philosophy.
13. Philosophy as Essentially Different from Science
Some analytic philosophers have motivated the objection that only 
science can be acquisition of knowledge by saying that philosophy is 
completely different from the sciences.
Thus, Dummett says that «philosophy stands in complete contrast 
with sciences»183. For, «its methods wholly diverge from those of science, 
and its objective differs to an equal extent», moreover «the results of phi-
losophy differ fundamentally in character from those of the sciences»184. 
Philosophy has problems and techniques of its own, not aimed at knowl-
edge acquisition, indeed, in philosophy «we face a cluster of problems 
that must be tackled by the techniques of the philosopher, not of the 
physicist»185. If «philosophy has budded off» a number of sciences «that 
have declared their independence from it», it is not because philosophy 
is continuous with the sciences, but because it contained extraneous ele-
ments, indeed, philosophy is «what is left when the disciplines to which 
it gave birth have left the parental home»186. That is, philosophy is what is 
left when it is liberated from extraneous elements; genuine philosoph-
ical problems are those which are left after this liberation. Owing to 
the presence of extraneous elements, «philosophy, although as ancient 
as any other subject and a great deal more ancient than most», has 
«remained for so long “in its early stages”», that is, in stages in which its 
practitioners had «not yet attained a clear view of its subject-matter and 
its goals»187. But, with the birth of analytic philosophy, philosophy has at 
last «struggled out of its early stage into maturity»188. Specifically, «the 
turning-point» in philosophy «was the work of Frege»189. For, «only with 
Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established», namely, 
183 M. Dummett, The nature and future of philosophy, cit., p. 7.
184 Ibidem.
185 Ivi, p. 30.
186 Ivi, pp. 3-4.
187 M. Dummett, Truth and other enigmas, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1978, 
p. 457.
188 Ibidem.
189 Ibidem.
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«that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought» 
as distinguished «from the study of the psychological process of think-
ing»; and «that the only proper method for analysing thought consists 
in the analysis of language»190. These are the defining characteristics of 
analytic philosophy.
But it is unjustified to say that philosophy stands in complete contrast 
with sciences, because its methods, objectives and results wholly diverge 
from those of the sciences. For, from its beginning in the Presocratic 
period onward, philosophy has pursued aims that are not essentially 
different from those of the sciences. Some of the present scientific results 
are answers to what were once genuine philosophical problems about 
something that, at the time, human beings did not yet know.
Also, it is unjustified to say that philosophy has problems and 
techniques of its own, not aimed at knowledge acquisition. If so, 
then, as Adorno says, «the argument deteriorates into the technique 
of conceptless specialists amid the concept, as it is now spreading 
academically in the so-called “analytic philosophy”, which robots 
can learn and copy»191.
Also, it is unjustified to say that, if philosophy has budded off a 
number of sciences that have declared their independence from it, it 
is because philosophy contained extraneous elements and, by bud-
ding off a number of sciences, has liberated itself from such extrane-
ous elements; genuine philosophical problems are those which are 
left after this liberation. This contrasts with the fact that, as stated 
above, some of the present scientific results are answers to what were 
once genuine philosophical problems.
Also, it is unjustified to say that, owing to the presence of extrane-
ous elements, philosophy has remained for an extremely long time 
in its early stages, but, with the birth of analytic philosophy, it has at 
last struggled out of its early stage into maturity. This is based on the 
assumption that, while in philosophy, for two and a half millennia, 
everything has been questioned, every stance has been just a matter 
of individual convictions, conversely, analytic philosophy has marked 
a turning point. It has started an entirely new approach to philoso-
phy, in which each philosopher, adding stone to stone, contributes to 
erect a shared building in cooperation with other philosophers. But 
this assumption is contradicted by the fact that, as pointed out above, 
190 Ivi, p. 458.
191 T. W. Adorno, Negative dialectics, Routledge, London 2004, pp. 29-30.
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analytic philosophers have opposite views even on key issues.
Also, it is unjustified to say that, specifically, the turning-point in 
philosophy was the work of Frege, with which was the proper object 
of philosophy finally established, namely, that the goal of philosophy 
is the analysis of the structure of thought, and that the proper method 
for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language. For, to say 
that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought, 
is based on the assumption that there is an isomorphism between 
thought and reality, so the analysis of the structure of reality reduc-
es to the analysis of the structure of thought. But this assumption is 
unfounded, because there are very many thoughts that have no corre-
spondence to reality, therefore, an analysis of the structure of thought 
need not say anything about the structure of reality. Moreover, to say 
that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the 
analysis of language, is based on the assumption that there is an iso-
morphism between language and thought. But this assumption is also 
unfounded, because it identifies thought with verbal thought, disre-
garding other kinds of thought, such as visual thought, which plays 
an essential role in scientific work. Thus, Einstein says: «The words or 
the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any 
role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem 
to serve as elements in thought» are, «in my case, of visual and some of 
muscular type»192. Hadamard says: «Words are totally absent from my 
mind when I really think», and «do not reappear in my consciousness 
before I have accomplished or given up the research»193.
14. Philosophy as Acquisition of Knowledge and Mathematics
Some analytic philosophers have motivated the objection that only 
science can be acquisition of knowledge also by saying that, like 
mathematics, philosophy is an armchair subject, requiring no inputs 
from experience but only thought. 
Thus, Dummett says that, unlike science, philosophy «is a discipline 
that makes no observations, conducts no experiments, and needs no 
192 A. Einstein, A testimonial, in J. Hadamard, The psychology of invention in the math-
ematical field, Dover, Mineola 1954, pp. 142-143. 
193 J. Hadamard, The psychology of invention in the mathematical field, Dover, Mineola 
1954, p. 75.
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input from experience: an armchair subject, requiring only thought»194. 
In this respect, philosophy is like «another armchair discipline: mathe-
matics. Mathematics likewise needs no input from experience: it is the 
product of thought alone»195. Thus, «philosophy shares with mathemat-
ics the peculiarity that it does not appeal to any new sources of informa-
tion, but relies solely upon reasoning on the basis of what we already 
know»196. The «example of mathematics benefits philosophy, despite 
their very different methodologies»197. For, it shows that thought, without 
any specialized input from experience, can «take us very far»198. Indeed, 
«look at how many wonderful things mathematics does: and yet it is 
“only” the logical derivation of consequences from evident principles»199.
But it is unjustified to say that only science can be acquisition of 
knowledge because, like mathematics, philosophy is an armchair 
subject, requiring no inputs from experience but only thought. 
To begin with, it is problematic to assert that mathematics is 
an armchair subject, requiring no inputs from experience but only 
thought. As Rota points out, this amounts to asserting that mathe-
maticians «spew out solutions of one problem after another by dint 
of pure brain power, simply by staring long enough at a blank piece 
of paper»200. Now, while this «may appropriately describe the way to 
solve the linguistic puzzles of today’s impoverished philosophy», that 
is, analytic philosophy, it «is wide of the mark in describing the work 
of mathematicians, or any kind of serious work»201. For, mathematics 
essentially involves interactions with the world beyond the armchair. 
As Atyah says, «almost all mathematics originally arose from exter-
nal reality»202. And most of subsequent mathematics has arisen from 
external reality. In fact, most mathematical problems arise from the 
external reality, and hence from experience, and are solved using 
hypotheses that are justified on the basis of their compatibility with 
194 M. Dummett, The nature and future of philosophy, cit., p. 4.
195 Ibidem.
196 Ivi, p. 10.
197 Ivi, p. 5.
198 M. Dummett, Prof. Vattimo, non dimentichi la ragione, «Il Sole 24 Ore», August 3, 1997.
199 Ibidem.
200 G.-C. Rota, Indiscrete thoughts, cit., pp. 100-101.
201 Ivi, p. 101.
202 M. Atiyah, Joint interview with Isadore Singer, by Martin Raussen and Christian Skau, 
«Notices of the American Mathematical Society» 52 (2005), pp. 223-231, p. 226.
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the existing knowledge, and hence with experience203.
Similarly, it is problematic to assert that philosophy is an armchair 
subject, requiring no inputs from experience but only thought. This 
is in conflict with the fact that almost all philosophy originally arose, 
in the Presocratic period, from external reality, and most of subse-
quent philosophy has arisen from external reality. In fact, most phil-
osophical problems arise from the external reality, and hence from 
experience, and are solved using hypotheses that are justified on the 
basis of their compatibility with the existing knowledge, and hence 
with experience. If philosophy is to answer questions of great import 
for an understanding of the world, it necessarily needs inputs from 
experience, and hence cannot require only thought. By thought alone, 
we can at most reformulate what we already know in other terms, not 
answer questions of great import for an understanding of the world.
15. The Objection that Ethics and Politics are about Values, not Facts
Against the view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge, several 
analytic philosophers have also objected that it excludes ethics and pol-
itics, because the latter are about values, while all knowledge is of facts.
Thus, Carnap says that «the philosophy of moral values or moral 
norms» is «not an investigation of facts», its purpose is «to state norms 
for human action or judgments about moral values»204. Now, a norm 
for human action, or a judgment about moral values, «is neither 
true nor false. It does not assert anything and can neither be proved 
nor disproved»205. So, norms or value statements «are not scientific 
propositions (taking the word scientific to mean any assertive propo-
sition)»206. They have «no theoretical sense. Therefore we assign them 
to the realm of metaphysics»207.
This objection, however, is based on the assumption that values 
and facts are completely independent of each other. But this assump-
tion is unjustified. For, on the one hand, values depend on what we 
know about the world or man, and may change as our knowledge 
203 For more on this, see C. Cellucci, Rethinking knowledge, cit., Part IV.
204 R. Carnap, Philosophy and logical syntax, Kegan Paul, London 1935, p. 23.
205 Ivi, p. 24.
206 Ivi, p. 25.
207 Ivi, p. 26.
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changes, so values depend on facts. On the other hand, values guide 
us in selecting the scientific problems to work on, the hypotheses 
to solve them, and the criteria for evaluating the hypotheses, so the 
selection of facts depends on values.
Then, it is unjustified to say that the view that philosophy is 
acquisition of knowledge excludes ethics and politics since the lat-
ter are about values, while all knowledge is of facts. As Dewey says, 
«inquiry, discovery take the same place in morals that they have come 
to occupy in sciences and nature»208. Indeed, «when the conscious-
ness of science is fully impregnated with the consciousness of human 
value», the «split between» the «scientific and the moral and ideal will 
be destroyed»209. If the claim is made that, in ethics and politics, «“val-
ues” are involved and that inquiry as “scientific” has nothing to do 
with values, the inevitable consequence is that inquiry in the human 
area is confined to what is superficial and comparatively trivial»210.
Like science, also ethics and politics are acquisition of knowledge, 
although not of theoretical knowledge but of practical knowledge, 
that is, knowledge as a means to action. Then, an answer to the 
objection that the view that philosophy is acquisition of knowledge 
excludes ethics and politics is already given by Plato. For he says that 
«it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men will make good 
decisions»211. Indeed, to make good decisions requires that men have 
«knowledge of all good things, and of their production in the present, 
the future, and the past, and of all bad things likewise»212.
Since ethics and politics are concerned with how men can make 
good decisions, it follows that both ethics and politics must be acqui-
sition of knowledge. Thus philosophy is acquisition of both theoreti-
cal and practical knowledge.
16. Propositional and Non-Propositional Knowledge
That philosophy is acquisition of both theoretical and practical knowl-
edge implies that philosophy is acquisition not only of propositional 
208 J. Dewey, Reconstruction in philosophy, Dover, Mineola 2004, p. 100.
209 Ibidem.
210 Ivi, p. xvi.
211 Plat., Resp., IV 428b 7-8.
212 Plat., Lach., 199d 5-7.
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knowledge but also of non-propositional knowledge. For, much practi-
cal knowledge is non-propositional.
Once again, this is made quite clear by Plato. For he says that, «when 
you talk about cobbling», you mean «the knowledge of making shoes»213. 
When you talk «about carpentering», you mean «the knowledge of mak-
ing wooden furniture»214. When you talk about about «farming», you 
mean «the knowledge of how to raise a harvest from the earth»215. Now, 
the knowledge of making shoes, the knowledge of making wooden fur-
niture, and the knowledge of how to raise a harvest from the earth, are all 
instances of practical and non-propositional knowledge.
Admittedly, Plato assumes that, in addition to practical knowl-
edge like the one just mentioned, non-propositional knowledge also 
includes intuitive knowledge. He describes the latter as something 
which «cannot in any way be expressed in words like other knowl-
edge» but «is suddenly born in the soul, as light that is kindled by a 
leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself»216. But one need not 
follow Plato in assuming that non-propositional knowledge includes 
intuitive knowledge. This assumption is unnecessary, because the 
acquisition of knowledge can be accounted for without appealing to 
any form of alleged intuitive knowledge217. 
That philosophy is acquisition not only of propositional knowl-
edge but also of non-propositional knowledge, contrasts with analyt-
ic philosophy. For, many analytic philosophers claim that knowledge 
can only be propositional. 
For example, Williams says that he cannot understand «how 
something can be non-propositional and yet knowledge»218. For, 
«knowledge requires judgements – thoughts or beliefs that can be 
true or false. Such thoughts demand propositional content: the sort 
of content that is expressed by complete sentences»219. Therefore, 
knowledge can only be propositional.
But the claim that knowledge can only be propositional conflicts 
with the fact that a large part of human knowledge is perceptual 
213 Plat., Theaet., 146d 6-8.
214 Ivi, 146e 1-2.
215 Plat., Resp., IV 428c 8. 
216 Plat. (?), Ep. VII, 341c 4-d 2.
217 For details, see C. Cellucci, Rethinking knowledge, cit., Sections 2.14, 12.11.
218 M. Williams, Problems of knowledge: A critical introduction to epistemology, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2002, p. 98.
219 Ivi, p. 140.
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knowledge, which is non-propositional and unconscious, being the 
result of processes that occur too fast and at too low a level in the mind 
to be accessible to direct inspection220. The claim that knowledge can 
only be propositional also conflicts with the fact that, as witnessed by 
the above cited statements by Einstein and Hadamard, thought pro-
cesses involved in scientific work are largely non-linguistic.
17. Analytic Philosophy and Progress
As already pointed out above, some analytic philosophers believe that, 
while in philosophy, for two and a half millennia, everything has been 
questioned, every stance has been just a matter of individual convic-
tions, conversely, analytic philosophy has marked a turning point. It has 
started an entirely new approach to philosophy in which each philos-
opher, adding stone to stone, contributes to erect a shared building in 
cooperation with other philosophers. This belief implies that, with ana-
lytic philosophy, philosophical problems may have an assured answer, 
so philosophy does make progress. For example, some analytic philoso-
phers believe that, thanks to analytic philosophy, far more about truth is 
known now than was known half a century ago, as a result of technical 
work by philosophical and mathematical logicians, and that it has been 
established that truth does not coincide with provability.
Thus, Williamson says that, «after two and a half millennia of 
futile attempts to answer» philosophical questions, a turning point 
has taken place in philosophy with the rise of «the broad, heteroge-
neous intellectual tradition we conveniently label “analytic philos-
ophy”»221. While philosophy remained for two and a half millennia 
in its early stages, with analytic philosophy it has arrived at «the end 
of the beginning»222. In fact, «in many areas of philosophy, we know 
much more in 2007 that was known in 1957»223. For example, «far 
more is known in 2007 about truth than was known in 1957, as a result 
of technical work by philosophical and mathematical logicians»224. 
Thus, «some parts of contemporary analytic philosophy just pass the 
220 For details, see C. Cellucci, Rethinking knowledge, cit., Chap. 15.
221 T. Williamson, The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Malden 2007, p. 279.
222 Ivi, p. 292.
223 Ivi, pp. 279-280.
224 Ivi, p. 280.
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methodological threshold for some cumulative progress to occur»225.
Marconi says that, with analytic philosophy, philosophical prob-
lems «may have an answer», and «at least some of them have had an 
answer», so, «in this sense philosophy has made progresses»226. For 
example, analytic «philosophy has established» that «truth does not 
coincide with provability»227. 
But, it is illusory to believe that, with analytic philosophy, phil-
osophical questions may receive an assured answer, therefore phi-
losophy does make progress. As already pointed out above, analytic 
philosophers have opposite views even on key issues.
In particular, it unjustified to say that, thanks to analytic philoso-
phy, far more about truth is known now than was known half a century 
ago, as a result of technical work by philosophical and mathematical 
logicians. For, the question is whether such technical work is relevant 
to our understanding of the world. This is doubtful, because it can be 
argued that the concept of truth is too rough to be useful for all serious 
uses in science, and must be replaced with more refined concepts228.
It is likewise unjustified to say that, thanks to analytic philosophy, it 
has been established that truth does not coincide with provability. For, 
this result – namely, Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem – cannot be 
ascribed to analytic philosophy but only to mathematical logic, which 
is a conventional, albeit somewhat marginal, branch of mathematics.
Gödel himself forcefully stresses that mathematical logic and his 
first incompleteness theorem owe nothing to analytic philosophy. 
Indeed, he says that «Wittgenstein’s negative attitude toward sym-
bolic language is a step backward. Those who, like Carnap, misuse 
symbolic language want to discredit mathematical logic; they want 
to prevent the appearance of philosophy»229. Generally, «the whole 
movement of the positivists wants to destroy philosophy; for this 
purpose they need to destroy mathematical logic as a tool»230. As to 
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, «Wittgenstein did not under-
stand it», indeed, «he interpreted it as a kind of logical paradox, while 
in fact it is just the opposite, namely a mathematical theorem within 
225 Ivi, p. 288.
226 D. Marconi, Il mestiere di pensare, cit., p. 90.
227 Ibidem.
228 For details, see C. Cellucci, Rethinking knowledge, cit., Chaps. 8-9.
229 H. Wang, A logical journey: From Gödel to philosophy, The MIT Press, Harvard 1997, 
p. 174, 5.4.10.
230 Ibidem.
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an absolutely uncontroversial part of mathematics (finitary number 
theory or combinatorics)»231. 
18. Normal Philosophy and Revolutionary Philosophy?
After dealing with the question of the relation of philosophy to knowl-
edge, I return to the question of the specialist view of philosophical work. 
I have already argued that the supposition that all philosophical 
work is cumulative, on which such view is based, is unjustified. On the 
other hand, Kuhn famously argued that the supposition that all scientific 
work is cumulative is unjustified and, on this basis, introduced a distinc-
tion between “normal science” and “revolutionary science”. Therefore, 
one might be tempted to introduce a similar distinction between “nor-
mal philosophy” and “revolutionary philosophy”.
Kuhn says that «“normal science” means research firmly based 
upon» a paradigm, namely, a set of fundamental assumptions that «some 
scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the founda-
tion for its further practice»232. During that time, all members of that «sci-
entific community work from a single paradigm»233. Therefore, «normal 
research» is «cumulative»234. On the other hand, “revolutionary science” 
means research in which a variety of alternatives to the old paradigm are 
put forward, but eventually a single new paradigm becomes established, 
thus all members of the scientific community in question «will again be 
practicing under a single, but now a different, paradigm»235. 
Similarly, one might be tempted to say that “normal philosophy” 
means research firmly based upon a paradigm, namely, a set of fun-
damental assumptions that some philosophical community acknowl-
edges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. 
During that time, all members of that philosophical community work 
from a single paradigm. Therefore, normal philosophy is cumulative. 
On the other hand, “revolutionary philosophy” means research in 
which a variety of alternatives to the old paradigm are put forward, 
231 Ivi, p. 179, 5.5.5b.
232 T. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1996, p. 10.
233 Ivi, p. 162.
234 Ivi, p. 96.
235 Ivi, p. 152.
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but eventually a single new paradigm becomes established, thus all 
members of the philosophical community in question will again be 
practicing under a single, but now a different, paradigm.
But the distinction between “normal philosophy” and “revolution-
ary philosophy” is unjustified, because the history of philosophy shows 
that at no time all members of a philosophical community work from a 
single paradigm, or eventually a single new paradigm becomes estab-
lished. Radical changes in the fundamental assumptions do occur in 
the philosophical work. A famous first example of this is the change 
that Raphael represented, in The School of Athens, by depicting Plato 
with his forearm upraised and his index finger pointing to the heavens, 
and Aristotle with his arm extended and his palms down to the earth.
Actually, it could be argued that even Kuhn’s distinction between 
“normal science” and “revolutionary science” is unjustified, because 
the history of science shows that at no time all members of a scien-
tific community work from a single paradigm, or eventually a single 
new paradigm becomes established. For example, Chang considers 
several episodes in the history of science in which «there was no 
system that deserved a monopolistic dominance», and «not having 
one dominant system in each situation did not hamper, or would 
not have hampered, the progress of science»236. Chang convincingly 
argues that «we are not likely to arrive at the one perfect theory or 
viewpoint that will satisfy all our needs», and «it is better to foster a 
multitude of worthwhile systems, rather than only one»237. Theory-
choice can «simply be a matter of each scientist deciding to take a 
particular avenue of investigation, without implying that all the other 
avenues are inferior, and that the inferior avenues should be closed 
off»238. Therefore, even the distinction between “normal science” and 
“revolutionary science” is unjustified.
19. Ordinary Philosophy and Extraordinary Philosophy
Instead of the distinction between “normal philosophy” and “revolution-
ary philosophy”, it seems more appropriate to introduce a distinction 
236 H. Chang, Is water H2O? Evidence, realism and pluralism, Springer, Dordrecht 2012, p. xix.
237 Ivi, p. xx.
238 Ivi, p. 288.
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between  “ordinary philosophy” and “extraordinary philosophy”.
As I have already said, radical changes in the fundamental 
assumptions do occur in philosophical work. To this it may be added 
that such radical changes are mainly the result of the influence of 
great philosophers, who introduce new fundamental assumptions 
that give rise to new philosophical traditions. 
A new philosophical tradition, however, does not necessarily 
supplant the previous ones, it may very well coexist, although even 
in fierce competition, with them. And, if different great philosophers 
in the same period give rise to different new philosophical traditions, 
none of them need become established. Even when, over time, some 
philosophical traditions die down, the work of the great philosophers 
who gave rise to them never becomes obsolete, it remains a vital 
source of inspiration for all successive generations. In fact, although 
virtually all views of great philosophers are sharply criticized, their 
work continues to be an essential reference point, even if only polem-
ical, in all subsequent philosophical work.
Actually, philosophical traditions develop not only because of 
the work of great philosophers, but also because of the work of not 
so great philosophers. Marconi says that a great philosopher «can 
do without studying his antecedents, not because he is aware of all 
of them as logical possibilities in his titanic mind, but because, to 
some extent, he has no antecedents»239. But this is unconvincing. The 
work of great philosophers does not come out of the blue, it is pre-
pared by that of other not so great philosophers, who either further 
develop or modify the work of previous great philosophers, or work 
at newly emerging questions that previous great philosophers could 
not consider and are essential to our understanding of the world. 
Thus, even the work of not so great philosophers may cause changes 
in philosophical traditions, although not as great as those caused by 
great philosophers.
In fact, also with respect to scientific work, Kuhn admits that, in 
addition to «major paradigm changes», there are «far smaller ones»240. 
A revolution is a «change involving a certain sort of reconstruction of 
group commitments. But it need not be a large change, nor need it seem 
revolutionary to those outside a single» scientific «community»241. This 
239 D. Marconi, Il mestiere di pensare, cit., p. 133.
240 T. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, cit., p. 92.
241 Ivi, p. 181.
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type of change occurs «regularly on this smaller scale»242. Of course, it 
does not produce «a displacement of the conceptual network through 
which scientists view the world»243. Thus, it is «not so obviously revo-
lutionary»244. Yet, it is revolutionary «for the members of a particular 
professional subspecialty»245. 
We may call the philosophical work of great philosophers 
“extraordinary philosophy”, that of not so great philosophers “ordi-
nary philosophy”. Unlike analytic philosophy, both extraordinary 
and ordinary philosophy are not concerned with what Dennett calls 
artifactual puzzles, but with questions essential to our understanding 
of the world. Thus, the difference between extraordinary and ordi-
nary philosophy does not lie in the kind of questions with which they 
are concerned – which is the same in both cases, questions essential 
to our understanding of the world – but only in the degree of origi-
nality of the answers given to those questions, which is higher in the 
case of extraordinary philosophy. Ordinary philosophy can even be, 
although need not be, cumulative, but philosophy as a whole is not 
cumulative. Indeed, if ordinary philosophy remains cumulative for 
a long period of time, eventually extraordinary philosophy prevents 
philosophy from getting bogged down in a state of quasi-stagnation.
The distinction between ordinary philosophy and extraordinary 
philosophy allows to give an alternative solution to the problem of 
the multiplication of philosophers. While Marconi maintains that 
the solution best suited to a situation in which professional philos-
ophers are some tens of thousands is analytic philosophy, as argued 
above this solution leads to the irrelevance of philosophy. A better 
solution is to say that what most philosophers should do in this sit-
uation is ordinary philosophy. Thus their work, rather than being 
irrelevant, will be useful to our understanding of the world, and will 
prepare the way for possible future great philosophers.
20. Conclusion
Bobbio says that the question “Where is philosophy going?” can be 
242 Ibidem.
243 Ivi, p. 102.
244 Ivi, p. 6. 
245 Ivi, p. 50.
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understood «in two ways», either «as a request to know where» one 
«thinks philosophy will actually go in the next few years», or «as an 
invitation to say where, according to» one’s «preference, philosophy 
should go»246. Thus, «the same person could give two diametrically 
opposed answers» to the question, «and in fact two mutually inde-
pendent ones. I observe that philosophy is going in one direction, but 
I would want it to go in the opposite direction»247.
Just so! I observe that philosophy is going in one direction, that is, 
irrelevance, but I would want it to go in the opposite direction.
However, the direction in which Bobbio would want philosophy to 
go seems unable to rescue philosophy from irrelevance. For, Bobbio 
says that, while «science gives partial answers», and yet answers, «phi-
losophy only asks questions without giving answers»248. Therefore, 
«one must not expect of philosophy what one expects of science, that 
is, answers, albeit partial ones»249. Indeed, «beyond the territories 
conquered by the scientific enterprise, there are only questions with-
out answer»250. This is «a territory into which one ventures, knowing 
that there is no way out»251. For, «at this point there ends the sphere of 
knowledge and there begins that of non-knowledge, or that of knowl-
edge by images, ciphers and symbols»252. 
The view that philosophy only asks questions without giving 
answers may be called, as Marconi suggests, «the jogger’s view» of 
philosophy because, for the jogger «the important thing is to run, not 
to arrive somewhere»253. Similarly, according to the jogger’s view of 
philosophy, for the philosopher the important thing is to ask ques-
tions, not to give answers. Sometimes, the jogger’s view of philosophy 
is ascribed to Socrates. Thus, Black says that «a major innovation» in 
«Socrates was asking questions without giving answers»254. But this is 
misleading. For, the questions Socrates asks are always “leading” ques-
tions, that is, questions phrased in a manner that tends to suggest the 
246 N. Bobbio, La filosofia e il bisogno di senso, cit., p. 64.
247 Ibidem.
248 Ivi, p. 46.
249 Ivi, p. 31.
250 Ivi, p. 67.
251 Ibidem.
252 Ibidem.
253 D. Marconi, Il mestiere di pensare, cit., p. 92.
254 A. Black, The “axial period”: What was it and what does it signify? «The Review of 
Politics» 70 (2008), pp. 23-39, p. 30.
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desired answer to the discussant.
Anyway, the jogger’s view of philosophy is inadequate. For, if phi-
losophy only asks questions without giving answers, how can philos-
ophy be useful, and what chance has it to continue to exist? For the 
layman, to receive no answer to a question from the philosopher is as 
frustrating as, for the child, to receive no answer to a question from 
the father. 
In fact, it is unjustified to say that, beyond the territories con-
quered by the scientific enterprise, there are only questions without 
answer. Beyond those territories there is the vast land of that which 
we do not yet know. There is no known reason why such land should 
be unknowable. Dealing with questions about that land requires new 
ideas, and philosophy may try to devise them. By so doing, when suc-
cessful, it may even open new paths and give birth to new sciences.
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